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ABSTRACT 
The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a very basic rule of probability. Interestingly, although 
committing the fallacy seems irrational, adults are no less susceptible to the fallacy than young 
children. In Experiment 1, by employing tasks where the conjunctive response option involved 
two non-representative items, we found a large reduction in fallacy rates as compared to 
traditional conjunction fallacy problems. Nevertheless, fallacy rates remained relatively high in 
both adolescents and adults, although adults showed more consistency in their normative 
responses. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that children’s relatively good performance on the 
task was not the consequence of their missing knowledge of social stereotypes. Additionally, 
children were more strongly affected by explicitly presented frequency information than adults. 
Indeed, adults only took frequency information into account when frequencies were made 
relevant by a training in probabilistic reasoning. Overall, the results suggest that whereas the 
potential for normative reasoning increases with development, this potential is often 
overshadowed by a pervasive tendency in adolescence and adulthood to rely on contextual 
information, knowledge, and beliefs, even when conflicting information is available. By contrast, 
children are more strongly influenced by explicitly presented information than relevant knowledge 
cued by the tasks.  
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Researchers of the development of judgment and reasoning generally assume that adults are 
characterised by an increased tendency for normative and rule-based reasoning as compared to 
children (e.g., Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008). At the same time, it is well-documented that 
adults often exhibit systematic deviations from normative rules, and they are susceptible to 
biases and the inappropriate use of mental shortcuts (see, e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002). Given that adults often exhibit suboptimal performance on reasoning tasks, the general 
assumption is that children’s performance on these problems must be even worse (or they might 
simply show random performance—cf. Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011). In fact, children’s 
performance on these tasks is rarely investigated, and we know relatively little about their 
judgment and reasoning skills, and the underlying factors.  
The aim of the present paper is to investigate developmental patterns from childhood to 
adulthood, as well as potential explanations for the observed developmental changes, using 
problems that are known to elicit the conjunction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a 
very basic rule of probability—that the probability of two events happening together (i.e., A&B) 
cannot be higher than the probability of either constituent event happening (e.g., A). People who 
commit the conjunction fallacy assign a higher probability to a conjunction than to one, or both, of 
its constituents. In the most famous demonstration of the fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), 
participants were presented with a description of Linda, a 31-year-old, smart, outspoken woman 
who was a philosophy major, concerned with discrimination and social justice, and a participant 
in antinuclear demonstrations. Participants were then asked to judge a number of statements 
about Linda according to how likely they were. When assessing the relative likelihood of the 
statements, the vast majority of participants ranked the statement “Linda is a bank teller and is 
active in the feminist movement” above the statement “Linda is a bank teller”—thus, committing 
the fallacy.  
Whereas much research has addressed the question of why fallacy rates are high amongst 
educated adults (Adler, 1984; Politzer & Noveck, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), much fewer 
studies investigated developmental changes in fallacy rates. Although one could expect that 
fallacy rates should be especially high in the case of children (as they can be expected to be less 
familiar with the conjunction rule), this does not seem to be a case. Davidson (1995) and 
Morsanyi and Handley (2008) used child-friendly versions of the original “Linda problem”, and 
they found that conjunction fallacy rates increased during the primary school years (between the 
ages of 5 and 11). Morsanyi and Handley (2013) extended this work to adolescents and young 
adults, and they reported an inverted U-shaped developmental pattern from childhood to 
adulthood, where fallacy rates increased during childhood, were at ceiling in adolescence, and 
then decreased again between adolescence and young adulthood. Interestingly, fallacy rates 
were equal between the child and adult samples.  
Inverted U-shaped developmental patterns are typically attributed to an interaction between two 
distinct cognitive processes that act in opposition, and that emerge at different points during 
development. In the case of the conjunction fallacy, the two opposing factors that have been 
proposed are the influence of the representativeness of the response options, and adherence to 
the conjunction rule (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The inverted U-shaped developmental pattern 
might be explained by assuming an initial increase in representativeness-based responses, 
which could be a consequence of increasing familiarity with the relevant stereotypes with age 
(e.g., Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). Then, once participants learn the conjunction rule, 
fallacy rates decrease.  
Indeed, some authors (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; Stanovich et al., 2008, 2011; Toplak et al., 
2014) have argued that the counterintuitive developmental patterns in childhood (i.e., an increase 
in fallacy rates) were simply the side-effects of using materials that were inappropriate for young 
children. Specifically, given that children were less familiar with the stereotypes evoked by the 
descriptions in the problems, they were also less influenced by the representativeness of the 
descriptions (as, for them, these descriptions did not seem representative to a particular group in 
the first place). In fact, although the problems included in Davidson (1995) and Morsanyi and 
Handley (2008) were designed for child participants, these authors did not check if the 
participants in their studies were actually familiar with the stereotypes evoked by the problems. 
Thus, one aim of the current work was to revisit this question by investigating conjunction fallacy 
rates in children, adolescents, and adults, making sure that only those participants who were 
familiar with the relevant stereotypes were included in the comparisons.  
Regarding the effect of the conjunction rule on responding, there is evidence that this increases 
with age. In particular, two studies, Chiesi, Gronchi, and Primi (2008) and Fisk and Slattery 
(2005), investigated familiarity with the conjunction rule in the case of children and adults using 
materials that did not cue pre-existing knowledge about social stereotypes. Chiesi et al. (2008) 
presented their participants with pictorial materials of flowers with or without a bee on them (A&B 
and A&notB). Chiesi et al. (2008) included participants from three age groups: 7-year-olds, 10-
year-olds, and young adults. The participants were presented with different scenarios where the 
proportion of A&B and A&notB items was systematically manipulated. For each scenario 
participants had to choose from three response options: A&B, A, or “both response options are 
equally likely”. Whereas the youngest children were not influenced by the relative frequencies of 
A&B and A&notB, older participants were strongly affected by frequency information, and this 
effect was the strongest in the case of adults (see also Chiesi, Primi, & Morsanyi, 2011; De Neys 
& Vanderputte, 2011 for evidence for increasing sensitivity to numerical and probability 
information with development). At the same time, the results suggested that both older children 
and adults interpreted the question as regarding a comparison between A&B and A&notB 
(instead of A&B vs. A) which is in line with a particular pragmatic explanation of the conjunction 
fallacy (e.g., Adler, 1984; Politzer & Noveck, 1991). Moreover, the fact that this kind of 
interpretation was more prevalent in older participants is in line with other studies which have 
shown that sensitivity to pragmatic cues increases with development (see Feeney, Scrafton, 
Duckworth, & Handley, 2004; Noveck, 2001). Thus, these results not only suggested an 
increased sensitivity to probability information in older participants, but also an increased 
tendency to rely on pragmatic inferences.  
Fisk and Slattery (2005) used a different version of the task where, similar to Chiesi et al. (2008), 
frequency information was explicitly provided, and pre-existing knowledge was not cued by the 
problem. Moreover, the materials were linguistically unambiguous (i.e., they did not allow for 
participants to interpret A as A&notB). There were three groups of participants: 5-year-olds, 9-
year-olds, and young adults. The task measured participants’ tendency to commit the conjunction 
fallacy when the conjunctive option was paired with a single non-representative event vs. when it 
was paired with a single representative event. Children from the two age groups showed virtually 
identical performance: about 60% fallacy rate in the case of a non-representative single event, 
and 40% fallacy rate in the case of a representative single event. For adults, fallacy rates were 
significantly lower: 29% and 9%, respectively. That is, based on these results, it could be 
concluded that about 29% of adults did not rely on the conjunction rule when a linguistically 
unambiguous task was used to measure the conjunction fallacy and probability information was 
presented explicitly. It is also clear that fallacy rates were much higher in the case of children, 
although it is possible that some of these errors stemmed from the relative complexity of the task. 
Nevertheless, overall both Chiesi et al.’s (2008) and Fisk and Slattery’s (2005) studies suggest 
that adults are better able to apply the conjunction rule than children.  
Although unfamiliarity with relevant social stereotypes could potentially explain the 
counterintuitive developmental trajectory of the conjunction fallacy, we present an alternative 
explanation. Specifically, we question a general assumption about reasoning development—that 
cognitive maturation involves a move away from simple heuristic processing towards effortful, 
normative reasoning. We are not the first developmental researchers to raise this issue. For 
example, Reyna and Ellis (1994) referred to the idea that reasoning development involves a 
gradual shift from predominantly heuristic to predominantly effortful reasoning as the “illusion of 
replacement”. In line with some earlier work, in the current paper we will argue that whereas the 
potential for normative reasoning increases with development, heuristic processing also develops 
(see, e.g., Morsanyi & Handley, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). That is, “simple heuristics” might 
not be as simple as they appear, and, in fact, reasoning development incorporates both an 
increased ability to reason on the basis of normative rules, and to use shortcuts.  
With regard to the conjunction fallacy, Morsanyi and Handley (2008) not only showed an 
increase in fallacy rates with age in the case of children, but they also showed that fallacy rates 
were positively related to children’s cognitive capacity (after controlling for the effect of age). 
Additionally, Morsanyi, Handley, and Evans (2010) found that adolescents with autism (a 
population characterised by a reduced tendency to spontaneously contextualise presented 
information,1 and a tendency to focus on verbatim details—see, e.g., Happé & Frith, 2006) were 
less susceptible to the fallacy than typically developing adolescents, although they were equally 
able to recognise the stereotypes cued by the descriptions. Additionally, in the case of 
adolescents with autism, the tendency to commit the fallacy was positively related to participants’ 
verbal ability.  
These findings suggest that at least some reasoning heuristics (such as the conjunction fallacy, 
for example) can be considered as developmental achievements, and these types of responses 
appear to require cognitive effort in the case of young children, as well as adolescents with 
autism. Morsanyi and Handley (2013) interpreted these findings as evidence that the ability to 
utilise pre-existing knowledge in the context of a reasoning task (a tendency that pervades adult 
reasoning) develops in children slowly and gradually. Thus, it is not a lack of relevant knowledge 
that prevents children from relying on context-based heuristics, but a difficulty with a 
spontaneous, flexible, and effortless application of this knowledge.  
Taken together, existing studies have provided some intriguing findings regarding developmental 
changes in the conjunction fallacy, and competing explanations for these developmental patterns 
have been offered by different theorists. In particular, it is of interest why in studies using “Linda 
problem”-type tasks susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy increases during childhood. 
Specifically, we were interested in whether this counterintuitive developmental pattern could be 
eliminated by ensuring that participants who are unfamiliar with the relevant social stereotypes 
are excluded from the developmental comparisons.  
Another aim of our paper was to demonstrate that, in contrast with children, adults show an 
excessive sensitivity to context. Indeed, this tendency is so pervasive that it has been termed the 
“fundamental computational bias” of human cognition (Stanovich, 2003). Although the majority of 
adult participants are familiar with the conjunction rule (e.g., Fisk & Slattery, 2005), they tend not 
to apply this knowledge in the context of typical conjunction fallacy tasks. Indeed, manipulations 
that are aimed at eliminating the fallacy, including both pragmatic modifications (Ahn & 
Bailenson, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1996; Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008; Tentori, Bonini, & Osherson, 
2004) and the inclusion of frequency information (e.g., Tentori et al., 2004; Wedell & Moro, 
2008), usually have limited impact on fallacy rates. In line with our account that assumes reduced 
sensitivity to contextual cues in children, in the current paper, we test the counterintuitive 
prediction that children might be more sensitive than adults to some experimental manipulations 
that are aimed at reducing fallacy rates. Specifically, whereas it can be expected that children 
would be less sensitive to pragmatic cues (Feeney et al., 2004; Noveck, 2001), they might show 
relatively strong sensitivity to explicitly presented frequency information. By contrast, adolescents 
might be particularly insensitive to such manipulations, as it can be expected that they have 
already developed the ability to spontaneously contextualise information, but they have more 
limited knowledge of normative rules than adults, and reduced ability to apply these rules.  
In order to investigate these predictions, in Experiment 1, together with traditional conjunction 
fallacy problems, we included problems with two non-representative conjuncts, in order to make 
the conjunctive response option less attractive. We expected that this manipulation would 
encourage participants to rely on the conjunction rule. In particular, by making the conjunctive 
option less attractive, we hoped to prompt a more careful consideration of the problems. We 
were also interested in whether this manipulation would affect adolescents and adults differently.  
Experiment 2 included a developmental comparison between children and adults. In this study, in 
addition to a traditional conjunction fallacy task, we also used a modified task, where frequency 
information was provided together with the response options. It was emphasised that a random 
selection process was employed, in order to highlight the relevance of frequency information. 
Additionally, some of our adult participants were provided with a training in probabilistic 
reasoning, to further encourage reliance on numerical/probabilistic information. Whereas on the 
basis of traditional approaches to cognitive development it could be expected that adults should 
be more sensitive to frequency information, we expected that children would be at least as much 
(or even more strongly) affected by frequency information as adults, given their reduced 
sensitivity to contextual information and stronger focus on explicitly presented details.  
In summary, the purpose of the following studies was twofold. First, we aimed to investigate 
developmental changes in the conjunction fallacy (using versions of the task which were 
comparable to the original Linda problem). In both experiments, we included the representative 
item alone as a response option, and we only included responses from participants who marked 
this as the most likely. This way, we were able to make comparisons between age groups with 
regard to their ability to recognise relevant stereotypes, and to use these as the basis of their 
likelihood ratings. Additionally, this made it possible for us to control the potential effects of 
stereotype-familiarity on developmental patterns. The second aim was to test a particular 
developmental account of the conjunction fallacy. According to this account, although the 
potential for normative responding increases with development, this potential often remains 
unexploited, even in the case of educated adults (see Experiments 1 and 2). We will argue that 
this is because adults place a great emphasis on the context in which different pieces of 
information are presented, at the expense of considering various pieces of information at their 
face value. At the same time, contextual information can be helpful in highlighting the relevance 
of certain details that are important for normative responding (see Experiment 2). By contrast, 
children are more focused on explicitly presented details and, as a result, they might reason at 
the same level or even more “normatively” than adults in some cases (Experiment 2).  
Experiment 1 
Our first experiment investigated developmental changes in susceptibility to the conjunction 
fallacy between early adolescence and adulthood. Previous studies (Klaczynski, 2001a; 
Morsanyi & Handley, 2013) reported no age-related change in fallacy rates in adolescence, and, 
at the same time, they showed that fallacy rates were at (or very close to) ceiling. However, 
Morsanyi and Handley (2013) found a reduction in fallacy rates in the case of young adults (as 
compared to adolescents). Thus, one aim of the study was to confirm these developmental 
patterns in a new sample. Another aim was to explore the effect of an experimental manipulation 
that was aimed at reducing fallacy rates. Specifically, beside traditional conjunction fallacy 
problems (where the conjunctive response option included a representative and a non-
representative item), we also administered a different version of the problems, which included the 
conjunction of two non-representative items—see Table 1. By making the conjunctive option less 
attractive, we hoped to encourage a more careful consideration of the response options, which 
could potentially increase reliance on the conjunction rule.  
 
 
Table 1. Examples of traditional (including the conjunction of a representative and a non-
representative item) and non-representative (including the conjunction of two non-representative 
items) versions of a problem.  
Traditional version Non-representative version 
Brian has a studio, where he works alone. He is a very creative man, and he likes to experiment 
with colours. He takes his work to exhibitions, and sells some of them too. Mark the following 
statements with number 1 to 4 according to how likely they are. (1: most likely, 4: least likely)  
_____Brian is an aerobics instructor. _____Brian is an aerobics instructor. 
_____Brian is a painter. _____Brian is a painter. 
_____Brian is a painter and an 
accountant. 
_____Brian is an aerobics instructor and an 
accountant. 
_____Brian is an accountant. _____Brian is an accountant. 
Note: Traditional and non-representative versions of problems with the same content were administered to 
different groups of participants. 
 
 
Note that even in the case of tasks with non-representative conjuncts, it is likely that participants 
still consider the representativeness of the conjunctive option, possibly by using some kind of 
averaging strategy (see, e.g., Aczel, Szollosi, & Bago, 2016; Fantino, Kulik, Stolarez-Fantino, & 
Wright, 1997; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996; Nilsson, Winman, Juslin, & Hansson, 2009). Nevertheless, 
given the implausibility of the response options, it is likely that participants will search for other 
possible cues for weighing the response options, which could make the relevance of the 
conjunction rule more salient. We were also interested in whether this manipulation would affect 
adults and adolescents equally. In particular, adults might be more sensitive to this manipulation, 
as they have higher cognitive capacity, and they are more likely to be familiar with the 
conjunction rule than adolescents.  
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-six participants were involved in this study. Fifty-eight students were recruited from years 
7 to 12 of two secondary schools in the South-East and South-West of England. In order to 
explore developmental changes in the conjunction fallacy during adolescence, we created two 
age groups: early adolescents (years 7–9 of secondary school; n = 29; 13 boys; mean age: 12 
years 3 months), and mid-to-late adolescents (years 10–12; n = 29; 12 boys; mean age: 15 years 
2 months). Additionally, 28 adult participants (mean age: 30 years 4 months; 11 males), recruited 
through a paid participant pool in the South-East of England, took part in the experiment.  
Materials 
Conjunction fallacy problems 
We used four conjunction fallacy problems (based on Morsanyi et al., 2010; see Appendix). In 
each task, participants had to rate four statements according to how likely they thought that the 
statements were true. One statement was representative (based on the description), two 
statements were non-representative, and the fourth statement was either a conjunction of a 
representative and a non-representative statement (i.e., in traditional conjunction fallacy 
problems) or a conjunction of two non-representative statements—see Table 1. In order to 
minimise content effects, we designed two sets of problems. Half of the participants in each year 
group were administered Set 1, and the other half were administered Set 2. The two sets of 
problems were designed in a way so that participants in one group solved the traditional version, 
and the other half of participants solved the modified version of the same problem (i.e., a 
problem which had exactly the same content, but included the conjunction of two non-
representative items), and each participant solved two problems of each type. In the case of the 
traditional problems, the measure of the conjunction fallacy was whether participants judged the 
probability of the conjunction of a representative and a non-representative statement as more 
likely to be true than the non-representative conjunct alone. In the tasks with non-representative 
conjuncts, the dependent measure was whether participants judged the conjunction of two non-
representative statements as more likely to be true than at least one of the conjuncts alone. 
Thus, we computed average fallacy rates taking into consideration both possible ways of 
committing the fallacy (i.e., if a person rated the conjunction as more likely than at least one of 
the conjuncts, then they committed the fallacy). Note that in the case of traditional problems there 
was only one possible way of committing the fallacy, given that we only included those 
participants in our analyses who marked the representative single event as the most likely. That 
is, theoretically, the likelihood of committing the fallacy in the case of non-traditional problems 
was twice as high as in the case of traditional problems. In summary, participants were 
administered two problems of each type. Each task was scored as 0 (did not commit the fallacy) 
or 1 (committed the fallacy), and we computed fallacy rates based on the average of these two 
scores. Thus, for both types of problem, there were three possible values: 0, 0.5, and 1.   
Procedure 
The conjunction fallacy problems were administered together with some other tasks (not reported 
here) as part of a group session.2 The different types of problems were presented in a booklet, 
together with the instructions. The problems were presented in a quasi-random order (with the 
constraint that two problems of the same type—for example, two conjunction fallacy problems—
were not presented consecutively). The experimenter read out the instructions, and the 
participants worked through the problems individually, at their own pace. The testing session 
took about 20 min altogether.  
Results 
In our analyses, we computed average conjunction fallacy rates only on the basis of those 
problems where participants marked the representative option as the most likely. We assumed 
that participants who identified the representative option as the most likely followed our 
instructions regarding how to mark the options, and they were also affected by the 
representativeness of the description (i.e., they did not avoid the fallacy in the case of a 
traditional problem simply because the item that they considered to be the most representative 
was not included in the conjunction). Early adolescents marked the representative option as the 
most likely in 88% of the cases, late adolescents did this in 92% of the cases, and adult 
participants did this in 95% of the cases. A chi-square test indicated that the difference between 
age groups was not significant (p = .18).  
Our analysis aimed at establishing whether participants were sensitive to our manipulation of the 
representativeness of the conjunctive response option (i.e., whether participants were less likely 
to commit the fallacy when the task included the conjunction of two non-representative events, as 
opposed to when it included the conjunction of a representative and a non-representative event). 
We also contrasted fallacy rates across the three age groups in order to investigate potential 
developmental changes in responding (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1.   Fallacy rates across problem types and age groups. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the means. 
 
 
 
A 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA with task version (traditional/task with non-representative conjuncts) as a 
within-subjects factor, and age group (early adolescent/late adolescent/adult) as a between-
subjects factor indicated a significant effect of task version (F(1, 83) = 19.10, p < .001,  = .19), 
and a marginal effect of age group F(2, 83) = 2.77, p = .069,  = .06), but no interaction between 
the two factors (p = .58). That is, participants were more susceptible to the fallacy when the 
conjunction included a representative conjunct (M = .82, SD = .35), as compared to when both 
conjuncts were non-representative (M = .59, SD = .38).  
We have also computed the proportion of participants who consistently avoided the fallacy in the 
case of both the traditional version of the task, and the task with non-representative conjuncts 
(see Figure 2). We included this additional analysis, as a consistent avoidance of the fallacy 
could give a stronger indication that participants were relying on normative considerations, 
instead of avoiding the fallacy because they found the conjunctive option particularly 
unrepresentative. A 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA with task version (traditional/task with non-
representative conjuncts) as a within-subjects factor, and age group (early adolescent/late 
adolescent/adult) as a between-subjects factor indicated an effect of age group (F(2, 83) = 3.47, 
p = .036,  = .08), but no effect of task version (p = .151), and no interaction between the two 
factors (p = .961). A post-hoc comparison using Tukey’s b test indicated that the proportion of 
participants who completely avoided the fallacy (averaged across the two task versions) was the 
lowest in the case of early adolescents (7%). This proportion was significantly lower than in the 
adult group (25%), but it did not significantly differ from the proportion of late adolescents who 
avoided the fallacy (19%). Finally, there was also no significant difference between the proportion 
of late adolescents and adults who consistently avoided the fallacy.  
 
Figure 2.   Proportion of participants who completely avoided the fallacy in the case of traditional 
problems and problems with two non-representative conjuncts. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the means. 
 
 
 
We also computed the correlation between fallacy rates across the two versions of the task. 
Spearman’s rho correlations indicated a weak, positive relationship (rs(84) = .22, p = .039). That 
is, those participants who avoided the fallacy in the case of one version of the task (e.g., in the 
case of the traditional version) were somewhat more likely to avoid the fallacy in the case of the 
other version as well.  
Discussion 
In line with earlier studies (Klaczynski, 2001a; Morsanyi & Handley, 2013), Experiment 1 
indicated that the majority of adolescents (both younger and older ones) committed the 
conjunction fallacy, just like most of the adult participants. The manipulation of the 
representativeness of the conjunctive response option had a large effect on fallacy rates (i.e., 
fallacy rates dropped substantially). Nevertheless, fallacy rates were still relatively high in all age 
groups, and there was no indication that older participants benefitted from the manipulation of the 
representativeness of the conjunctive option to a greater extent than younger participants. 
Although there was a trend towards a decrease in fallacy rates with age, this did not reach 
significance.  
When we also looked at the proportion of participants who consistently avoided the fallacy in the 
case of each version of the task, we found no effect of task version. However, this analysis 
showed a significant effect of age. This indicated that a higher proportion of adults than early 
adolescents managed to consistently avoid the conjunction fallacy (with late adolescents 
performing at an intermediate level). Nevertheless, although the manipulation was successful in 
making the conjunctive response option less attractive, it clearly did not result in participants’ 
switching from a predominantly heuristic-based responding to predominantly normative 
reasoning. Additionally, whereas a significant minority of participants avoided the fallacy in the 
case of each version of the task, normative responding across the two task versions was only 
weakly correlated. That is, it appeared that there were very few participants, who consistently 
relied on the conjunction rule as the basis of their responses across both versions of the task.  
In summary, Experiment 1 showed that although making the conjunctive response option less 
attractive reduced fallacy rates, normative performance remained weak, and the consistency of 
applying the conjunction rule across the two versions of the task was also relatively low. Thus, it 
is possible that even when the conjunction included two non-representative items, participants 
still remained focused on the representativeness of the response options (see, e.g., Aczel et al., 
2016; Fantino et al., 1997; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996; Nilsson et al., 2009). Regarding age-related 
changes, there was some evidence of an increase in normative responding between early 
adolescence and adulthood. In particular, adult participants were more likely to consistently apply 
the conjunction rule in the case of both the traditional and the non-representative conjunct 
version of the task. Beside an increased understanding of the conjunction rule, it is also likely 
that older participants have an increased ability to recognise the relevance of this rule. 
Nevertheless, the results clearly show that even adult participants were reluctant to respond on 
the basis of the conjunction rule.  
When we consider the relatively low level of normative performance, it should be noted that 
(similar to the original “Linda problem”), we did not state that the “item” described in the task was 
randomly selected from a population, and, thus, no explicit cues were provided for participants to 
apply the normative rules of probability (Gigerenzer, 1996; Hertwig et al., 2008; Politzer & 
Noveck, 1991). We also did not instruct participants to reason logically, which is known to 
improve reasoning performance both in adolescence and in adulthood (e.g., Chiesi et al., 2011). 
Thus, it is possible that although our participants did take normative considerations into account, 
given that these considerations were not supported by the context of task administration, they 
had a limited effect on responses.  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that simply making the conjunctive response option more attractive was 
not enough to trigger a switch from representativeness-based to normative responding in the 
case of either adolescents or adults. Additionally, the effect of the manipulation was similar 
across age groups, although adults’ reasoning was somewhat more normative in general.  
In Experiment 2 we extended our investigation of developmental patterns to children. In 
particular, we wanted to address two questions. The first one was why a significant minority of 
children avoid the conjunction fallacy, although it is unlikely that they have a good understanding 
of the conjunction rule. The second one is, conversely, why adolescents and adults fail to use 
their knowledge about the conjunction rule (which many of them possess) to avoid the 
conjunction fallacy. We propose a single explanation for these phenomena: a developmental 
increase in the tendency to contextualise presented information. Given that in Experiment 1 
adolescents exhibited similar response patterns to adults (although they were somewhat more 
susceptible to the fallacy), in the present study we just focused on the two extreme age groups: 
children and adults.  
As we described above, Morsanyi and Handley (2008) proposed that conjunction fallacy rates 
increased with age during childhood, because older children were more sensitive to contextual 
information (i.e., relevant background knowledge, the presence or absence of other response 
options, etc.) than younger children. Indeed, this interpretation was also supported by another 
study on the conjunction fallacy with adolescents with autism (Morsanyi et al., 2010). Moreover, 
Morsanyi and Handley (2008) demonstrated this tendency in a number of different problems. 
One of these was the sunk cost fallacy (i.e., the tendency to continue to invest resources in order 
to achieve an aim which turned out to be worthless, because previous investment had already 
been made). Young children were less affected by past investments in these cases, and, thus, 
their decisions, which were based on the evaluation of the aim (which was not worth achieving), 
were more rational than that of older children.  
A similar age-related change has been reported in the case of the “lost money/lost ticket” 
scenarios (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the “lost ticket” scenario a person loses a ticket which 
is worth $10 on the way to the theatre, and they have to decide whether they would purchase 
another ticket for the play. In the other scenario, the person loses a $10 note, and they have to 
decide whether they would still purchase a ticket which costs $10. The typical finding with adults 
is that although the investment is exactly the same in both scenarios, people tend to indicate that 
they would be more likely to buy a ticket if they lost the money, as opposed to if they lost the 
ticket which they bought earlier. Webley and Plaisier (1998) found that older children (between 
the ages of 8 and 12) increasingly showed this bias, but young children (ages 5–6) did not.  
There is further evidence to show that children are not as much influenced by the framing of 
objectively identical information as adults. For example, when young children are given four toys 
from which two toys are then subtracted (which is treated as a loss by older children and adults), 
they perceive this situation as identical to another scenario where they are given two toys (which 
is treated as a gain by older participants—see Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Finally, children’s memories 
of presented information are also more literal. For example, when presented with a list of 
semantically related words, such as bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, they 
are less likely than adults to recall a related but non-presented word (e.g., sleep)—see, e.g., 
Brainerd, Reyna, and Zember (2011).  
In contrast with children, adults show an excessive sensitivity to context (which has also been 
referred to as the “fundamental computational bias”—cf. Stanovich, 2003). Thus, we propose that 
a reduced susceptibility to this bias in young children could provide an explanation for the 
puzzling developmental findings where children’s decisions appear to be more rational than that 
of adults. Potential explanations for susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy in adults include 
relying solely on the representativeness of response options (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), 
high sensitivity to pragmatic cues (e.g., Politzer & Noveck, 1991), and using subjective instead of 
objective probability as the basis of responding (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996). In fact, all of these 
explanations belong to the same broad category of a tendency to contextualise, and we expect 
that all of these tendencies would be less prominent in young children than in older children and 
adults.  
Nevertheless, as we described earlier, some researchers (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; 
Stanovich et al., 2008, 2011) have proposed that an apparent increase in conjunction fallacy 
rates during childhood could have arisen because existing studies used descriptions of social 
stereotypes which young children were unfamiliar with. In order to control for this potential 
confound, similar to Experiment 1, we included the representative item on its own as a choice 
option, and we excluded those participants from our analyses who did not mark this option as the 
most likely.  
The most important aim of the present study, however, was to demonstrate the relative context-
sensitivity of adults as compared to children. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated how adolescents 
and adults tend to ignore their knowledge about the conjunction rule in favour of the more salient 
cue of representativeness. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) demonstrated a more 
extreme case of this insensitivity to probability information in their famous “engineers and 
lawyers” problem, and this finding has been replicated several times (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008). In this task, participants are provided with a description of a person (a stereotypical 
description of an engineer) who was randomly selected from a large group of people, consisting 
of an extremely high proportion of lawyers and a very low proportion of engineers. In this case, 
the vast majority of participants judge the person to be more likely to be an engineer than a 
lawyer, in spite of its low probability based on frequency information. Pennycook and Thompson 
(2012; see also Pennycook, Trippas, Thompson, & Handley, 2014) showed that base rate 
information was processed effortlessly by adults, and they also demonstrated that although 
educated adults readily detected the incompatibility between stereotype information and base 
rates, they often judged stereotype information to be more diagnostic, and, as a result, 
“neglected” base rates. Based on these findings, a possible interpretation of the results of 
Experiment 1 is that our participants considered the relevance/diagnosticity of 
representativeness and the conjunction rule on a case by case basis, and they generally 
considered representativeness to be the more relevant cue. Nevertheless, as we did not 
independently measure participants’ knowledge of the conjunction rule in our study, it is still 
possible that some of our participants were unaware of this rule.  
In Experiment 2, we implemented a manipulation whereby we provided explicit frequency 
information about the number of people belonging to the categories corresponding to A, A&B, 
and B. Note that by providing frequency information, we eliminated the need for participants to 
apply the conjunction rule, and our task is basically a measure of whether participants prefer to 
base their responses on representativeness (which has to be inferred from the description), or on 
explicitly presented frequency information. We hypothesised that children would be more likely to 
rely on this explicitly presented information than adults (see, e.g., Jacobs & Potenza, 1991), 
given their more literal interpretation of task information. At the same time we expected that, 
similarly to the typical findings on the engineers and lawyers problem, the majority of adults 
would ignore frequency information.  
Finally, to further demonstrate the context-sensitivity of adult cognition (and how it can also be 
supported by context), we implemented another manipulation, which affected the context of task 
administration.3 Whereas adult participants in the control condition were administered the 
conjunction fallacy task in the context of a study setting where they solved a series of reasoning 
tasks (some of which included numerical information, but they were unrelated to the conjunction 
fallacy), participants in the experimental condition were administered the task after a session 
which was designed to elicit a “mathematical mindset”, and took about 30 min. As part of this 
session, participants had to reason about various probabilistic events, such as repeated tosses 
of a coin, drawing marbles from a population with known probabilities with or without 
replacement, and simple, conjunct and disjunctive events derivable from a 2 × 2 contingency 
table. Additionally, they were explained about some fundamental rules of randomness and 
probability (but this did not include the conjunction rule). We hypothesised that these activities 
would reduce fallacy rates by making numerical information more salient and relevant.  
Method 
Participants 
The participants were primary school children (n = 302; 233 males; mean age = 9 years 6 
months), undergraduate students with a special training in probability (n = 97; 11 males; mean 
age = 21 years), and undergraduates without a special training in probability (n = 158; 32 males; 
mean age = 20 years 3 months). In the pilot study, a separate sample of 145 children (83 males; 
mean age 9 years 7 months) and 62 undergraduate students (8 males; mean age = 20 years 4 
months) participated.  
Materials and procedure 
We created two different versions of a single task (see Table 2), and each participant was given 
only one of these (thus, participants’ performance was scored as 1 = committed the fallacy; 
0 = did not commit the fallacy). The tasks were based on a child-friendly version of the “Linda 
problem” (similar to one of the problems used by Morsanyi & Handley, 2008). Both versions 
included information that the child was randomly selected from a class, in order to ensure that 
the normative rules of probability were relevant and appropriate to apply in the context of the 
task. Additionally, in the first task, the actual number of children belonging to each group which 
corresponded to the response options was given. In the case of both tasks, the response options 
included the representative item alone, a representative-non-representative conjunction, and the 
non-representative item alone. Similar to Experiment 1, the measure of fallacy4 was whether 
participants rated the conjunction as more probable than the non-representative item alone. 
Primary school children and university students without a training were administered the task as 
part of a bigger testing session. University students with a training were administered the task 
after a training session, together with some other problems.  
 
 
Table 2. Different versions of the problem used in Experiment 2.  
With numerical information 
Without numerical 
information 
From a class of 30 children, 12 play football, 4 play music and 2 
play both football and music. 
From a class of 30 
children …  
the teacher picked at random a child for an assignment. Tom was chosen. Tom lives in a house 
with a large garden. His favourite school subject is playtime. He has many friends and he loves 
sport. He collects football stickers.Mark the following statements with numbers 1 to 3 according 
to how likely they are to be true. Mark the statement which is the most likely to be true with 1, 
and the one which is the least likely to be true with 3. 
a. Tom plays football. 
b. Tom plays football and music. 
c. Tom plays music. 
 
Before the main study, a pilot study was conducted (this was also embedded in a bigger testing 
session including other tasks). In this study, the same problem was used as in the condition with 
numerical information. However, in this version, the representative item alone (i.e., “Tom plays 
football”) was not included, but it was replaced by the statement “Tom has a younger sibling”. 
The aim of this preliminary study was to confirm that the content of the task was appropriate for 
children.  
Results 
We report the results of the pilot study first. As expected, both children and adults were highly 
susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. Indeed, 82% of the children (SD = .38), and 89% of the 
adult participants (SD = .32) committed the fallacy. A Mann–Whitney U test indicated that fallacy 
rates did not differ between the two groups (p = .233).5 
Now we turn to the results of the main study. First, in order to check whether children were as 
able to recognise the stereotype cued by the description as adults, we compared the proportion 
of participants who identified the representative option as the most likely across the two age 
groups (primary school/university), using a chi-square test. In the primary school sample, 86.4% 
of the children identified the representative option to be the most likely, as opposed to 94.5% of 
participants in the university student sample. The difference between age groups was significant 
(χ2 (df = 1, N = 554) = 10.06, p = .002). We also checked whether the proportion of children who 
marked the representative option as the most likely changed with age using Pearson product–
moment correlation. The relationship was significant, indicating a moderate increase with age in 
the child sample (r(300) = .22, p < .001). Finally, given that in the case of the task with numerical 
information, it was possible that children selected the representative option as the most likely 
purely on the basis of the numerical information provided, we have additionally compared the 
proportion of children who selected the representative option as the most probable across the 
two versions of the task. A chi-square test indicated no significant difference (p = .61) between 
the proportion of children who marked this option as the most probable in the case of the task 
where numerical information was provided (86%) versus in the task where this information was 
not provided (87%).  
The purpose of our next analysis was to compare fallacy rates across groups when numerical 
information was present/absent (see Figure 3). Similar to Experiment 1, in this analysis we only 
included those participants who marked the representative option as the most likely. Thus, we 
excluded 41 primary school students, 9 university students from the control condition, and 5 
university students from the mathematical mindset condition.  
 
Figure 3.   The effect of the presence/absence of numerical information on fallacy rates across 
groups. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of the means. 
 
 
 Given the categorical nature of the data, a logistic regression analysis was conducted with fallacy 
committed/not committed as a dependent variable. The predictor variables were numerical 
information (present/absent) and level of education (primary school students/university 
students—control /university students—mathematical mindset). The three levels of the latter 
variable were transformed into dummy variables, with university students (mathematical mindset) 
considered as a reference. The logistic regression model was statistically significant (χ2 (3, 
N = 493) = 32.01, p < .001). About 62% of cases were correctly classified (fallacy committed: 
55%; fallacy not committed: 69%) by the full regression model. The relative influence of the 
predictors is shown in Table 3. Fallacy rates significantly increased when numerical information 
was absent (i.e., without numerical information, participants were twice as likely to commit the 
fallacy).6 There was no significant difference between university students (mathematical mindset) 
and primary school students. Fallacy rates were lower in university students (mathematical 
mindset) and primary school students than university students in the control condition. 
Specifically, students in the control condition were three times more likely to give fallacious 
responses than students with a “mathematical mindset” and primary school students. Finally, the 
interaction between numerical information and mathematical mindset was also significant (χ2 (5, 
N = 493) = 36.50, p < .001). Indeed, students with both a mathematical mindset and numerical 
information were the least likely to commit the fallacy. Specifically, for the task without numerical 
information, fallacy rates were 60%, 68%, and 52%, for the primary school students, university 
students (control), and university students (mathematical mindset), respectively. In the case of 
the task with numerical information, fallacy rates were 38%, 62%, and 26%, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression with conjunction fallacy as dependent variable (no fallacy/fallacy).  
Predictors B Wald p 
Odds 
ratio 
95% CI 
Numerical information 0.74 15.47 <.001 2.09 
1.45–
3.02 
Educational level   17.32 <.001     
Primary school 0.39 2.31 .129 1.47 
0.89–
2.42 
University students (control) 1.09 15.06 <.001 2.98 
1.72–
5.17 
Mathematical mindset × numerical 
information 
1.32 6.29 <.001 3.10 
1.28–
7.52 
Note: Overall model evaluation: Likelihood ratio test: χ
2
 = 32.09, df = 3, p < .001. Goodness-of-fit test: Hosmer & 
Lemeshow: χ
2
 = 2.72, df = 4, p = .61; Nagelkerke R
2
 = .08. Correct classification: 62%. 
 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to understand why children perform relatively well on conjunction 
fallacy problems (despite their relatively poor knowledge of the rules of probability), and why 
adults perform relatively poorly (despite their generally better understanding of probabilities). We 
suggested that both of these puzzling phenomena could be explained by differences between 
children and adults in their tendency to use contextual information, as opposed to a tendency to 
rely on a literal interpretation of explicitly presented information.  
Regarding children, some researchers (e.g., Stanovich et al., 2008, 2011) suggested that their 
seemingly good performance could be just a side-effect of using unfamiliar stereotypes in the 
problem descriptions. Indeed, our results provided some evidence for this claim. Specifically, a 
lower proportion of children than adults marked the representative item as the most likely option, 
and there was also a weak, but reliable correlation between children’s age and their tendency to 
mark this option as the most likely. Nevertheless, the vast majority (86.4%) of children in our 
sample marked this option as the most likely, and this was the case even when frequency 
information was not provided. Moreover, although we only included those children in our 
analyses who marked the representative option as the most likely, their overall performance was 
still relatively good (indeed, significantly better than that of university students’ in the control 
condition). It is also important to note that we replicated an earlier finding (Morsanyi & Handley, 
2013) which showed that children performed at the same level as adults on the traditional version 
of the task. Indeed, in the present experiment, this was still the case when we compared children 
with university students who participated in a session which was designed to elicit a 
“mathematical mindset”.  
Another remarkable finding regarding children’s performance is that they showed high sensitivity 
to explicitly presented numerical information, similar to adults in the “mathematical mindset” 
condition (see also Jacobs & Potenza, 1991). Arguably, in general, adults are better able to use 
probability information than children (e.g., Chiesi et al., 2011), and we do not want to challenge 
this assumption. For example, Jacobs and Potenza (1991) showed that although children were 
more sensitive to base rates than adults in the case of problems with a conflict between 
representativeness and base rates, their justification of their responses did not indicate a 
conscious reliance on normative considerations.  
We propose that the reason for children’s relatively good performance is that (as compared to 
adults) they are characterised by an increased sensitivity to explicitly presented information 
(including irrelevant surface characteristics), and reduced sensitivity to information which can be 
inferred from presented information (specifically, a social stereotype, in this case). This 
interpretation is consistent with results from adolescents with autism in the case of the 
conjunction fallacy task (Morsanyi et al., 2010), and more general findings regarding children’s 
reasoning development (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2011; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Webley & Plaisier, 
1998). These findings are also in line with the general claim of the fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., 
Reyna & Brainerd, 2011) that adults tend to prefer “gist-based processing” (i.e., processing for 
meaning rather than verbatim detail), whereas children are more literal in their interpretation, 
especially if they do not have to recall details from memory. What is particularly remarkable, is 
that children disregarded stereotype information, although they marked the representative option 
as the most likely. Thus, they activated the stereotype, and used it as the basis of finding the 
most likely response. Nevertheless, this knowledge was not utilised as much when they 
evaluated the conjunctive option.  
A few potential issues regarding the contextualisation account should be noted. Although our 
child participants demonstrated familiarity with the relevant stereotypes, this does not necessarily 
mean that the degree of familiarity was the same across children and adults.7 It is quite plausible 
to suppose that children do not consistently use stereotype information, because the retrieval 
process is effortful and/or because keeping this activated information in mind requires effort. 
However, even if it was only the stereotype identification stage that was difficult for children, this 
would still be in line with our conclusion that the contextualisation process is more effortful for 
children than for adults. Note that this is in contrast with some mainstream accounts of the 
development of reasoning skills. Consider for example this commentary on Jacobs and Potenza 
(1991) by Toplak et al. (2014, p. 1038):  
… younger children are prevented from showing the bias because they do not know the 
stereotype. Older children, however, will be familiar with this stereotype. This will artificially 
create a pattern looking like a non-normative bias increasing with age. In fact, it is not really a 
processing bias increasing with age, but the knowledge that makes showing the bias possible 
that increases with age.  
Based on our results, we can conclude that, in fact, relevant knowledge is available, and it is 
indeed the processes involved in retrieving and using this knowledge that differ between children 
and adults (i.e., these processes are less fluent/more effortful in the case of children). This is also 
consistent with the existence of a positive correlation between certain reasoning biases and 
cognitive capacity in young children (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008) and in adolescents with autism 
(Morsanyi et al., 2011).  
Regarding the results with adults, probably the most striking finding is that students in the control 
condition did not use explicitly presented frequency information. More precisely, although the 
presentation of frequency information slightly reduced fallacy rates, the majority of these 
participants still committed the fallacy. This result is especially interesting, given that it was 
explicitly stated that the person who was described in the task was randomly selected from a 
group, thus, the argument that the rules of objective probability are irrelevant (e.g., Gigerenzer, 
1996) does not apply in the case of these tasks. Although it seems curious that explicitly 
presented frequency information might be ignored, as we described earlier, similar findings have 
been reported in the case of the famous “engineers and lawyers” problem of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973). The fact that participants did not utilise frequency information is also entirely 
consistent with the results of Experiment 1, where participants’ normative performance did not 
improve when the conjunctive response option was made much less attractive (at least 
participants did not consistently rely on the conjunction rule even in this case).  
The current results are also consistent with Pennycook and Thompson (2012; see also 
Pennycook et al., 2014) who found that, although reasoning with base rates was routine and 
relatively effortless in the case of adults, and if there was a conflict between base rates and 
stereotype information, people readily detected this, whether they decided to rely on base rates 
or stereotype information depended on the context of task administration. Similarly, in the current 
study, for adults who participated in a session emphasising the importance of probability 
information, the relevance of numerical information was more evident, and their responses 
changed accordingly. However, although it is very likely that adults in the control condition also 
noted the frequency information provided in the task, they did not rely on this, as they judged it to 
be less relevant than the representativeness of response options. The assumption that reasoning 
with base rates requires little effort (cf. Pennycook & Thompson, 2012) is also supported by the 
fact that children readily used this information. In fact, when this information conflicted with 
representativeness, children preferentially based their responses on base rates.  
It could be argued that a weakness of our design is that, although the single representative item 
was twice as likely as the conjunctive option (on the basis of base rates), maybe this difference 
was not large enough to provide a convincing cue for participants to switch from a 
representativeness-based response to a base rate-based response. It is possible that adult 
participants would have showed a greater sensitivity to base rates if the differences between 
frequencies linked to each response option were larger. Future studies could compare sensitivity 
to base rates between children and adults while manipulating frequency information (i.e., how 
extreme base rates are). At the same time, it is remarkable that inducing a “mathematical 
mindset” had a dramatic effect on the performance of adult participants (i.e., leading to a three-
fold reduction in fallacy rates). When frequency information was made relevant and, thus, salient 
by presenting it in the context of a probability training, adults shifted their preference from a 
general tendency to judge the response options on the basis of representativeness to a tendency 
to judge them on the basis of probability. This demonstrates the two faces of context-sensitivity: 
leading to both an ability to utilise subtle cues, and to a susceptibility to rely on irrelevant 
information.  
To summarise our interpretation regarding the differences between children and adults; first, it is 
important to note that without the frequency information primary school children were just as 
susceptible to the fallacy as adults (as also evidenced by the results of our pilot study, and as 
previously reported by Morsanyi & Handley, 2013). Thus, based on the traditional conjunction 
fallacy task alone, there is no evidence that stereotype information would affect children’s 
judgments less strongly. Nevertheless, we propose that the underlying processes are different. 
Some adults avoid the fallacy because they spontaneously recognise the relevance of the 
conjunction rule. By contrast, children who avoid the fallacy find the conjunctive option 
improbable for other reasons. For example, they might simply think that “children who play 
football usually don’t play music”, so this is an unlikely event. It is not that they are completely 
unaffected by the stereotype cued by the description (as they all marked the representative 
single option as the most likely), but this is less salient or available than other cues (such as the 
actual content of the response options and frequency information) or they might find it more 
difficult to link the description of the child to the conjunctive response option. When the task is 
presented together with frequency information, although adults obviously have no problem with 
processing frequencies (cf. Pennycook & Thompson, 2012), they probably find this information 
irrelevant, and base their responses preferably on stereotype information, unless the relevance 
of base rates is highlighted (for example, by inducing a “mathematical mindset”). Many children, 
however, will take frequency information at face value, and this is why their likelihood ratings for 
the conjunctive options will be lower.  
General discussion 
In two experiments, we tested the “contextualisation” account (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008) of 
developmental changes in the conjunction fallacy. Although there is a vast literature dealing with 
the conjunction fallacy phenomenon, so far there are only a handful of studies that have 
investigated developmental changes in responding. These studies have established that on 
versions of the tasks which have a similar format to the famous “Linda problem” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982), fallacy rates tend to increase during childhood (Davidson, 1995; Morsanyi & 
Handley, 2008), and young children show similar performance to adults (Morsanyi & Handley, 
2013). These findings are surprising, given existing evidence that young children are less 
sensitive to probability information in pictorial conjunction fallacy problems than older children 
and adults (Chiesi et al., 2008), and when the linguistic ambiguity inherent in the task is 
eliminated in pictorial problems, children are less able to apply the conjunction rule than adults 
(Fisk & Slattery, 2005).  
In Experiment 1, we showed that in adolescence and adulthood, fallacy rates dropped 
considerably when the conjunctive option was non-representative. In this case, approximately 
half of our participants did not commit the fallacy. Nevertheless, making the conjunctive option 
less attractive did not increase the number of participants who consistently relied on the 
conjunction rule. In other words, although the manipulation had a large effect on response 
patterns, it did not prompt a switch from representativeness-based to normative responding. 
Thus, it is likely that although the conjunctive option was rated as less probable when it 
contained two non-representative options as compared to when one of the conjuncts was 
representative, our participants mainly relied on the representativeness of the response options 
in the case of both types of task. Indeed, consistent normative responding in the case of both 
versions of the task was rare in both adolescents and adults, although adults performed better 
than adolescents.  
Experiment 2 provided further evidence that adults’ reasoning was primarily determined by 
contextual information. When the need to apply the conjunction rule was eliminated by explicitly 
providing frequency information, the majority of university students without training still 
disregarded probabilities. This clearly demonstrates that most of these participants perceived 
frequency information to be irrelevant to their judgments. However, when a “mathematical 
mindset” was induced in participants, and, thus, numerical information appeared relevant, 
participants’ performance improved, especially when frequency information was explicitly 
provided. Although our manipulations that were aimed at cueing analytic processing in 
Experiments 1 and 2 remained remarkably inefficient (with the exception of a combination of 
frequency information and a general training in probabilistic reasoning), it is possible that if we 
used more sensitive measures (e.g., inspection times, or ratings of response confidence), we 
could have observed some effect of these manipulations. Indeed, reasoners sometimes show 
evidence that they experience a conflict between heuristic and analytic considerations, even 
when they give heuristic-based responses (e.g., De Neys, 2012). That is, although their 
responses showed a dominant influence of representativeness, it is possible that these 
responses were generated less fluently and confidently by our participants, as a result of our 
manipulations.  
In terms of developmental investigations, previous studies with children (De Neys & Feremans, 
2013) and adolescents (e.g., De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011) showed that younger 
reasoners tend to be worse at detecting conflict than adults. Based on our results, it is possible 
that, at least in the case of children, weaker evidence for conflict could be to some extent 
attributed to relatively weaker influence of heuristic cues (although normative considerations are 
also likely to have a smaller effect in the case of children). Future studies could also investigate 
whether various manipulations (e.g., manipulating the salience of relevant stereotypes or 
frequency information) could affect conflict detection ability in children and adults differentially. 
For example, it is possible that in the case of the task with explicit frequency information in 
Experiment 2, children would experience a higher level of conflict if the relevant stereotypes were 
made more salient. This would be especially interesting if, at the same time, the manipulation 
would increase heuristic responding. By contrast, the same manipulation might result in lower 
levels of experienced conflict in adults.  
Regarding children’s performance, our findings lend some support to claims that they might be 
less able to recognise relevant stereotypes cued by the tasks than adults (cf. De Neys & 
Vanderputte, 2011; Stanovich et al., 2008, 2011), or that they might be less able to use these 
stereotypes as the basis of their judgments. Nevertheless, even when this confound was 
eliminated, children showed a more literal, and, thus, more normative interpretation of the 
response options than adults. Most strikingly, when frequency information was presented, 
children switched from a tendency to commit the fallacy to a tendency to avoid the fallacy, which 
did not happen in the case of adults, unless the relevance of probability information was 
specifically highlighted to them.  
Osman and Stavy (2006) discussed the role of bottom-up and top-down saliency in people’s 
interpretation of tasks, where bottom-up saliency is based on the objective characteristics of 
presented stimuli, and top-down saliency is based on participants’ knowledge of (and previous 
experiences with) the stimuli. Our findings suggest that there is a developmental shift from 
childhood to adulthood from a dominant reliance on bottom-up, to a dominant reliance on top-
down saliency. Specifically, in our view, whereas during childhood, the most important 
developmental achievement seems to be an increasing ability to integrate contextual information 
(e.g., Morsanyi & Handley, 2008), by adolescence contextualisation becomes fairly automatic 
and effortless, and the main driving force of developmental change is an increasing knowledge of 
normative rules, and an increasing ability to retrieve and implement these rules when needed 
(e.g., Chiesi et al., 2011; Stanovich et al., 2008). Together these changes can explain the 
inverted U-shaped developmental trajectory of judgment and reasoning fallacies between 
childhood and adulthood, which were observed by Morsanyi and Handley (2013). These changes 
could be related to the development of executive functioning skills (i.e., the ability to ignore 
salient, but irrelevant distracters when processing higher level information—e.g., Richland, 
Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006), and to the accumulation of knowledge which becomes more 
ingrained and, thus, easier to activate with development. At the same time, there is a shift from 
literal to pragmatic (Chiesi et al., 2008; Feeney et al., 2004), non-contextualised to contextualised 
(Evans, 2011; Morsanyi & Handley, 2008) and verbatim to gist processing (e.g., Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2011).  
Although we provided a general framework for understanding developmental changes in the 
conjunction fallacy, as a limitation of this paper, we should highlight some issues that were not 
addressed by the current experiments. It has been long recognised (see Reyna, 1991) that to 
some extent conjunction fallacy problems correspond to Piaget’s (1965) class inclusion 
problems. Nevertheless, the issue of whether some young children commit the fallacy because 
they misunderstand class relationships has never been addressed. More precisely, Fisk and 
Slattery (2005) investigated children’s class inclusion performance together with their 
performance on a version of the conjunction fallacy task, and found that these were unrelated. 
However, in their version of the conjunction problem, the potential class inclusion confound was 
already eliminated.  
We also did not address the role of pragmatic understanding in performance differences between 
children and adults (see, e.g., Chiesi et al., 2008; Feeney et al., 2004; Noveck, 2001). For 
example, it could be expected that including the “A&notB” option together with the “A” option 
would have a greater effect on the performance of adults than that of children. Nevertheless, in 
our view, the increasing sensitivity to pragmatic cues is just one aspect of a more general 
developmental trend to be more influenced by context as children get older.  
In Experiment 2, we demonstrated how adults’ interpretation of the same task information 
changed depending on the context of task administration (i.e., whether frequency information 
was made salient). Indeed, as we discussed earlier, there is ample evidence for the sensitivity of 
adult participants to contextual information. One procedure that has been used in several studies 
to demonstrate this flexibility in handling information is to instruct participants to reason on the 
basis of logic vs. to reason on the basis of their intuitions or feelings (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994; Klaczynski, 2001b; Morsanyi, Primi, Chiesi, & Handley, 2009). In these cases, participants 
in the two instruction conditions show different response patterns. In line with our claim that 
context-sensitivity increases with development, Chiesi et al. (2011) found that instructions had a 
greater effect on adults’ as compared to children’s responses, and this developmental change 
appeared to be related to increases in cognitive capacity, and the knowledge of normative rules. 
Given that instructions can be used to highlight certain task characteristics, we would expect that 
detailed instructions to treat the conjunction problems as tests of probabilistic reasoning would 
reduce fallacy rates, and this improvement would be greater in the case of adults than in the 
case of children. Nevertheless, all the above suggestions remain to be tested in future studies.  
Our findings regarding reduced context-sensitivity in children relative to adolescents and adults 
are in line with some earlier investigations, where other paradigms were used, such as the 
framing effect (Reyna & Ellis, 1994), the sunk cost fallacy (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008), and the 
lost money/lost ticket scenarios (Webley & Plaisier, 1998), and problems with a conflict between 
base rates and stereotype information (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991). However, it is important that 
future studies extend these systematic investigations of judgment and reasoning skills in young 
children to other tasks, and confirm the generalisability of our developmental claims. Our findings 
can also be linked to studies that reported increases in intuitive errors with experience (Reyna, 
Chick, Corbin, & Hsia, 2014) and education (e.g., Morsanyi, Handley, & Serpell, 2013; Morsanyi 
et al., 2009; Van Dooren, De Bock, Hessels, Janssens, & Verschaffel, 2005).  
A final aspect of our results that is worth noting is their relevance to the debate on human 
rationality (e.g., Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000), and to the question of 
whether people become more rational (and better reasoners) with development. The implications 
of our findings are very simple and clear. The potential for normative, rule-based reasoning 
increases with development. Nevertheless, whereas context-sensitivity is a key characteristic of 
human cognition, and it is a major contributor to the flexibility of adult thinking, in some cases it 
can lead to response patterns that violate some very basic normative rules. When this happens, 
young children’s responses appear to be at least as normative and rational (if not more so) as 
that of adults’. Thus, the “illusion of replacement” (cf. Reyna & Ellis, 1994) is indeed an illusion. 
Adolescents and adults will rely on normative reasoning only when this seems to be the most 
appropriate as indicated by contextual cues.  
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2. These tasks consisted of reasoning problems that required the use of numerical information that were 
piloted for the purposes of another study.  
3. Throughout the paper, we use the term “context” in a very broad sense, but in general we refer to 
additional information presented together with key task information. Thus, within a conjunction fallacy 
task, context refers to the description of the person in the task, the response options included, as well 
as the overall context of task administration (e.g., following a training session in probabilistic 
reasoning).  
4. As we explained earlier, the task with numerical information is not a conjunction fallacy task, as 
knowledge of the conjunction rule is not necessary for participants to give a normative response. 
Nevertheless, based on frequency information, rating the conjunctive response as more likely than the 
single non-representative response was non-normative. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we referred to 
this type of response as a “fallacious” response.  
5. Given that the gender distribution of the child and adult samples was different, we also compared 
fallacy rates across male and female participants. Gender was not a significant predictor of 
conjunction fallacy rates (p = .310). As gender differences are not customarily reported in this 
literature, we do not report these analyses in the main text.  
6. Given that the gender distribution of the child and adult samples was markedly different, we also run 
this analysis with the inclusion of gender. Gender was not a significant predictor of conjunction fallacy 
rates (p = .494), and the inclusion of gender did not substantially change the other results.  
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